Abstract. Examining shifting diplomatic and military initiatives undertaken by bands of Ute Indians in New Mexico, this article locates forms of colonial violence at the center of the early American West. Through their adaptations to the arrival of new colonial technologies, economies, and motivations, the Ute and other Indian peoples throughout northern New Mexico responded to the arrival of Spanish colonialism in creative and often violent ways. While forms of band consolidation, equestrian adoption, and increased warfare have characterized many studies of the indigenous West, less attention has been paid to the diplomatic strategies initiated by equestrian leaders in their new worlds. Increased diplomacy and alliance formation characterize the earliest recorded Comanche and Ute histories and offer windows into how Europeans influenced indigenous geographies as well as how various Shoshonean speakers responded to such transformations.
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Comanche studies of the past decade, an important but at times limiting form of Comanche exceptionalism now permeates many versions of western history.
By resituating the origins of Comanche hegemony, this article proposes alternative and less teleological paradigms for conceptualizing Indian histories along New Spain's northern edge of empire. Far from being inherently predisposed to militancy, the Comanche adapted to violent social relations already long established throughout the colonial Southwest. Moreover, they did so in close conjunction with their Ute neighbors, with whom they shared more than simply language. In an enduring, albeit sporadically documented alliance, the Comanche emerged onto New Mexico's plains not alone but in confederation with the Ute, who had endured waves of colonial disruptions dating back nearly a century. Such waves had flowed north from New Mexico since its earliest days and reconfigured Ute and other northern Indian peoples in dramatic ways. Most notably, Spanishintroduced diseases, technologies, and economies engulfed the Ute in cycles of disruptive and violent change. Spanish metals did more than simply replace native weaponry; horses did more than augment native mobility; and the motivation to trade, raid, and enslave became more than additional variables in the calculus of native economics. Such technologies, incentives, and goods altered the fabric of everyday life in increasingly violent ways. With each passing year, Spanish technologies, particularly metals, spread to more distant native peoples and transformed their manufacturing, trading, and military capacities. Horses similarly revolutionized native economies and increased territorial conflicts and resource competition.7 Significantly, Spanish leaders also encouraged and rewarded those groups who most consistently ferried resources into the colony. Coming into the province to trade their captives, skins, hides, and horses, the Ute and other northern peoples received essential trade goods, better equipping them to return to their homelands to acquire more resources for future exchange. Obtaining such items to trade, however, required tremendous and often violent labor, as intertribal conflicts over captives, hunting grounds, and resources escalated throughout the colonial era. As in other zones of encounter and along other slaving frontiers, colonialism violently reconfigured indigenous societies before their lands became the actual sites of colonization. The new economies, relations, and technologies of violence and the complicated multilateral world they engendered provide essential context for understanding the emergence of New Mexico's northern Indian powers.8
As such waves reverberated north from Santa Fe, they crashed against native societies, who tried as best they could to absorb the shock. Slave raids, latter as combatant-providers. They needed both. Without the Comanche their access to New Mexico became compromised, but as the Comanche acquired growing horse herds on the southern Plains, the Ute became less central to Comanche fortunes. Indeed, despite their long-standing ties, by midcentury, the Ute increasingly threatened Comanche prospects.
Since the Reconquista, the Ute and the Comanche had competed for common resources but had done so as allies who shared spoils, raiding territories, and military information. By the 1750s, the Comanche had become more powerful than the Ute through the development of Plains trade networks around which Comanche economies now revolved. They were no longer a mountain people and no longer depended on their Ute allies. Once facilitated by Ute alliance, the Comanche expanded quickly, bringing themselves into a more bountiful world where multiple imperialists, trading partners, and resources-most notably bison and horsegrazing grasslands-would make these former allies of the Ute something greater indeed. As the political economy of the borderlands increasingly linked peoples across multiple regions, the Ute found themselves suffering from their allies' transition to the Plains. No longer able to depend fully on the Comanche to help navigate New Mexico's north, the Ute grew isolated and confronted the region's pandemic cycles of violence alone. Their dilemma in 1700 had been how to survive in the north without allies. Soon it became how to endure with them.11
The Displacement of Violence and the Origins of the Comanche-Ute Alliance, the 1600s
Spanish conquerors already knew of New Mexico's northern Indian people prior to their colonization. They were "savage Indians"-indios bárbaros-peoples who refused Spanish missionization and settlement and thus could be conquered in battle and enslaved. Unlike the sedentary and horticultural Pueblo communities, outlying Indians were nomadic peoples "without reason," similar to those whom the Spanish had encountered during Spain's conquest of northern Mexico during the sixteenth-century "Chichimeca Wars." Linguistically and culturally distinct, northern native groups appeared too scattered and unsettled for New Mexican leaders, who generally had little interest in moving off the Rio Grande. 12 Following Spanish conquest in 1598-99, different Athapaskanspeaking peoples, initially referred to as "Vaqueros Apaches," and "Apaches Navajo," became the first northern groups incorporated into the colony's political economy. Relative newcomers themselves to the Southwest, the Apache and Navajo had traded with Pueblo communities for generations prior to Spanish contact, and after conquest they became drawn into the currents of empire.13 Quickly consolidating control over the region's immediate hinterlands, the Apache and Navajo better positioned themselves to acquire horses, metals, and the resources with which to trade for them, such as captives and hides. Their raids against the colony, however, often prompted retaliation. In the 1650s, for instance, Navajos west of the Rio Grande attacked Jemez Pueblo, killing nineteen and capturing thirty-five. New Mexican governor Juan de Samaniego y Xaca responded by invading Navajo territories, killing untold numbers while enslaving 211. While many Apache and Navajo bands continued to trade with New Mexicans, the increasing raids and reprisals eroded the confidence between the region's codependent yet antagonistic neighbors. In response to Navajo counterattacks in the early 1660s, for example, Governor Bernardo López de Mendizabal murdered Navajo traders who came to trade at Jemez, enslaving their women and children, and did the same to unsuspecting Apaches at Taos. He also launched campaigns into Apache and Navajo homelands, acquiring hundreds of additional slaves to be sold to the slave and mining centers to the south. By early 1664, Apache and Navajo reprisals had become so fierce that the new governor forbade the entrance of any bárbaros into the pueblos at all, further eroding the prospects for peaceful exchange and enhancing the incentives for raiding.14 The first century of Spanish rule included countless examples of Spanish aggression against and retaliations by Navajo and Apache groups, as lightning-quick raids and internecine warfare plunged the region, as Thomas Hall puts it, into a state of "endemic warfare."15
By the last decades of the 1600s, as the Pueblo Revolt exiled the Spanish for over a decade, Navajo, Apache, and more distant Ute bands profited from the Spanish absence, escalating their attacks on the Rio Grande.16 Armed with new weaponry and horses, these raiders also ventured to their north and began incorporating more distant native peoples into the folds of New Mexico's economy, some as captives, some as traders, and some, like the Comanche, as allies. During the twelve-year Spanish absence, the circulation of weapons, horses, and goods accelerated throughout the region, further spreading these technologies and relations of violence onto more distant peoples and territories.17 This displacement of violence reshaped distant Indian communities, forcing many for defensive reasons to consolidate into larger political units, while pushing others into new political alliances and still others to migrate to more proximate trading and raiding locales. All such realignments characterize the earliest recorded moments of Comanche history and help explain the subsequent rise of both Ute and Comanche militancy. The origins of Comanche hegemony lie, then, not with the Comanche alone-far from it-but in their relations with other native peoples, particularly the Ute, and the multipolar world of violence that formed following Spanish colonization.18
The Comanche and the Ute speak related Numic branches of the UtoAztecan, or Shoshonean, language family, and Comanche scholars have consistently drawn on Comanche linguistic origins to explain their migration south onto the Plains.19 The earliest "Comanches" lived in small bands throughout the northeastern Great Basin and began migrating onto the Plains in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. According to Dan Flores, "the Comanches' drive to the south from their original homelands in what is now southwestern Wyoming and northwestern Colorado was part of the original tribal adjustment to the coming of horse technology to the Great Plains. There is reason to believe that the Eastern Shoshones, from whom the Comanches were derived . . . were one of the first intermountain tribes of historic times to push onto the Plains."20 Combing archaeological and ethnographic records for additional traces of their Shoshonean origins, Comanche scholars all agree that the Comanche were once a Great Basin people whose migration onto the Plains was initiated by the many advantages of equestrianism.
Such linguistic and ethnographic claims are incontrovertible. Contemporary Comanche speakers speak a Numic dialect intelligible by Nevadan Shoshones, among others, and Comanche oral histories locate Comanche origins along the eastern slopes of the Rockies.21 Preoccupation with such Great Basin origins, however, obscures as much as it reveals. Discussions of Comanche "prehistory" that situate these groups in fixed and accessible categories of analysis cannot withstand scrutiny, since these discussions often assume static notions of political identity and maintain timeless claims about Indian culture. Flores's claim, for example, that once the Comanche became bison hunters, "appear[ing] to have abandoned all the old Shoshonean mechanisms, such as infanticide and polyandry, that had kept their population in line with available resources," relies on problematic ethnographic texts that identify essential "Shoshone" and "Comanche" traits and then project them throughout history.22 With no documented references in sixteenth-or even seventeenth-century Comanche history, scholars often rely on ethnographies to shed light into the earliest moments of Comanche history and unwillingly perpetuate a series of methodological and essentialist dilemmas. They take postcontact ethnographic and political designations and apply them to peoples and times removed from the revolutions initiated by European invasion, often minimizing and naturalizing the relations of violence engendered by colonialism. Although sparsely documented, Spanish-Ute relations in the 1600s mirrored those of surrounding groups, particularly in the reoccurring cycles of trade, raiding, and enslavement. As early Spanish expeditions throughout the Southwest encountered various Ute and other Great Basin peoples, these Shoshone-speakers responded in multiple ways to the powerful influences emanating from New Mexico. Seventeenth-century Spanish sources indicate heightened levels of conflict, greater migratory ranges, and increased band consolidation throughout Ute territories in northern New Mexico and Colorado. The first documented Spanish encounter with identifiable Ute peoples, for example, came shortly before 1639, when Governor Luis de Rosas returned to Santa Fe after raiding northern peoples. Accused of violating loosely regulated protocols against Indian slavery, Rosas reportedly provoked an "unjust war against the 'Utaca' nation" that "killed many and brought . . . eighty people in capture."27 Many of these captives ended up in New Mexico's forced labor workshops, or obrajes, while others were taken further away from their homelands to slave and mining centers to the south.28
Rosas's slave raid provides an appropriate and inauspicious beginning to Spanish-Ute relations. "Unjustly" enslaved at the hands of superiorly armed and mobile forces, these unidentified Utes quickly comprehended the painful new logic of Spanish-Indian relations. The fact that Rosas killed "many" while also enslaving eighty testifies not only to the region's heightened levels of violence but also to the increasing concentration of northern peoples in larger groups capable of absorbing, if not repelling, violent attacks. Like all surrounding peoples, the Ute responded to the displacement of violence with the best deterrent they initially could muster: numerical strength. Anthropologists have long argued that smallscale band organization remained the predominant sociopolitical form for Great Basin groups into the contact period.29 Rosas's raid and subsequent seventeenth-century Spanish observations shed light on the emergence of larger Ute territorial groups, if not bands. While building upon existing political and cultural institutions, such consolidation suggests the creation, or even ethnogenesis, of larger bands throughout New Mexico's northern hinterlands.30 Rosas's raid, furthermore, destroyed an existing Ute encampment, forcing survivors to flee to neighboring communities along this traumatic edge of empire.
The fact that Rosas's and subsequent Spanish raids devastated large, unspecified Ute communities further reveals the difficulties in identifying northern peoples. Such bands often consisted of hundreds of tents that, when encamped, the Spanish referred to as rancherías. Within such encampments, distinctions among native groups often remained unclear to Spanish chroniclers. By the mid-1700s, as Ute and Comanche bands shifted allegiances, New Mexicans began using more precise territorial and band designations. Projecting these classifications back onto earlier periods, however, becomes problematic. Bands of undifferentiated "Ute" and later "Comanche" peoples traveled through unmapped lands, lived at times among different native groups, and suffered largely undocumented raids, like that by Rosas, in which the total number of casualties remains unknown. Assigning clear political or even territorial distinctions to these worlds remains, then, not only difficult but also dangerous, potentially categorizing unidentifiable peoples into static topologies.
While such ethnographic distinctions remain inherently partial, the Spanish did recognize broad linguistic, political, and territorial differences among their neighbors that provide fragmented, if limited, insight into the transformations occurring in the north. Often using Pueblo informants, New Mexicans differentiated between bands of Navajos and Apaches with whom they had sustained trading and diplomatic relations. The Ute, however, initially remained outside of the realms of Spanish knowledge, only rarely in the seventeenth century venturing into New Mexico. In the decades following Rosas's raids, for example, Utes only appear in missionary descriptions of the colony's distant north. They lived, as Fray Alonso de Posados, custodian to New Mexico's missions from 1661 to 1665, noted, in "a land which the Indians of the north call Teguayo," approximately one hundred leagues to the northwest.31 Although Rosas had attacked and enslaved a large "Utaca" encampment to the north, few Spanish leaders, traders, or missionaries traveled northwest out of the colony during the 1600s.32 By the end of the seventeenth century, then, Shoshone-speaking peoples remained largely outside the spheres of European colonization but increasingly within spheres of European influence.
Like Navajo and Apache groups, Ute bands faced the threat of Spanish enslavement, interwoven with the growing need for Spanish goods. The Ute and other surrounding peoples accordingly formed larger political units not only for defensive, military purposes but also to increase their territorial ranges. New Mexican trade fairs at Taos and Pecos had attracted northern people for centuries, and they expanded during the colonial era.33 Spanish settlers, desperate themselves for economic development in this distant corner of empire, rewarded those Indian groups who most consistently brought in items of value, most notably hides, furs, dried meats, and slaves. New Mexican and Plains Indian trade fairs became hubs in the region's political economy around which all peoples revolved, native and nonnative alike.
For Indian communities, these new trading relations quickly became critical lifelines. Acquiring these trade items, however, required sustained and often violent labor. As the Spanish rewarded those who ferried resources into New Mexico, increased militarization and internecine warfare accompanied Spanish trade goods out of the colony. While Pueblo Indians received certain rights in colonial society, outlying groups had only their own strength and numbers for protection. As Elizabeth John states, "Missionaries vigorously protested the enslavement of Indians and could largely protect their Pueblo charges from that illegal fate, but no power on the northern frontier could prevent the enslavement of 'wild' Indians."34 Indios bárbaros, thus, not only had to defend themselves against Spanish incursions but also against each other, as raids, counterraids, reprisals, and counterreprisals plagued every Indian society in the region, violent cycles of destructive frontier conflicts characterizing northern Indian relations throughout the colonial era. Largely undocumented, the increased violence brought heightened pain, terror, and trauma to the everyday lives of native peoples throughout the early West.
It was in this world of heightened violence and trade goods that "Yutas" peoples struggled to survive. Native groups had long raided and even enslaved each other prior to Spanish intrusion, but never to such an extent or with such frequency.35 Larger consolidated bands, capable of more rapid and greater territorial movement, and using new forms of weaponry, militarized New Mexico's expanding hinterlands. New Mexicans also encouraged such violence, using Indian allies for military purposes and Indian traders for economic gain. Subject to raids from their native and Spanish neighbors, Ute and other Indian bands redirected violence against each other, but also back against New Mexico, the source of disruption. Following Rosas's raid, Ute bands suffered from such attacks by Apache, Navajo, and even Pueblo raiders. As the Apache and Navajo in the 1600s incorporated new trade goods and consolidated their own societies for defensive and raiding purposes, their relations with the Ute devolved into violence.36 Pueblo groups similarly used their familiarity with Spanish technologies to raid northern peoples, particularly after the Pueblo Revolt, when the diffusion of Spanish technologies, particularly horses, increased. During the Reconquista, for example, after sacking Taos and returning to Santa Fe from the northwest to avoid potential Pueblo counterattacks, Governor Diego de Vargas encountered Ute groups near the Colorado border who mistook his battalion for Pueblo warriors, who had recently "often come to this region . . . disguised as Spaniards, mounted, and with leather jackets [armor], leather hats [helmets], firearms, and even a bugle."37 While sparsely documented, such intertribal attacks, like Rosas's earlier raid, now shaped Ute communities in critical ways.
At greater distance from New Mexico and in conflict with New Mexico's most proximate Indian powers, the Ute developed strategies of survival that soon made them among the most powerful peoples in the region. Shortly after the Pueblo Revolt, the Ute became middlemen in the expanding horse trade. Although few seventeenth-century sources suggest direct Ute involvement with the horse trade, scholars often date the spread of the horse to the 1680 Pueblo Revolt and locate the Ute at the center of such dispersal.38 Drawing largely from environmental assessments of the region's grasslands, scholars conclude that Ute, Apache, and later Comanche groups not only incorporated horses into their societies but also increasingly spread them through extensive trade networks. Many seventeenth-century Apache groups, however, maintained semiseden-tary, horticultural villages north of Santa Fe. They were primarily village farmers, not nomadic horse traders. 39 The Ute by contrast were not horticulturalists but seasonal hunters who traveled to trade, hunt, recreate, and worship. Such migratory economies in the late 1600s intersected with the spread of equestrianism, as the Ute adapted horse trading to their seasonal patterns. Intimately familiar with the diverse ecologies of the Rocky Mountain-Plains borderlands, the Ute became among the West's first equestrian societies, camping, hunting, and trading along the eastern steppes of the Rockies.
Horses, like Spanish metals, accelerated the displacement of violence. As horses facilitated their movement, Indian groups traveled, migrated, and hunted across greater distances. They also increasingly fought, killed, and enslaved each other. Horses and the violent political economy that they extended shattered and recalibrated native worlds throughout New Mexico's expanding hinterlands. Spanish leaders were aware of the growing magnitude of horse trading and constantly attempted to stem the spread of horses out of the province. They had little idea, however, of the range of the horse's influence and even less of its violent effects on Indian peoples. While colonial officials bemoaned equestrian raids on New Mexico, such attacks paled in comparison to the intertribal warfare that native peoples endured. Spanish colonialism and its attendant technologies of violence sparked infernos of conflict that raged throughout western North America, as the horse became a critical element in the region's violent remaking.
Surprisingly, few have drawn larger conclusions about the primacy of the Ute in the spread of the horse.40 Throughout the first decades of the eighteenth century, the Ute had horses. They knew how to acquire, keep, and maintain them. They knew firsthand of their military and economic import, and they used this knowledge not only to fend off hostile Indian attacks but also to create stronger relations with new partners and allies. Having suffered through decades of raids, the Ute needed allies, and they began identifying potential neighbors for such purposes. Concomitantly, other Shoshonean-speaking migrants had entered onto the Plains, drawn in part by the abundance of game, bison, and now horses. These Comanche newcomers also needed horses, allies, and trading partners, as well as access to New Mexico. The Ute could supply these needs. For, despite their initial hostilities in the 1630s, by the time of the Reconquista, Ute leaders had established incipient trading relations with New Mexicans and had secured partial favors from colonial officials. Before the Pueblo Revolt, for example, Governor Antonio de Otermin noted that New Mexico had "finally found itself . . . on the eve of having more [peace] than ever, with the hopes of the reduction to our holy faith of the innumerable and warlike nation of the Yutas . . . [whom] we have been treating."41 Similarly, in the aftermath of the Reconquista, de Vargas invited the Ute groups whom he encountered to Santa Fe, "as had been their custom prior to 1680."42 By 1700, then, the Ute not only had horses, they also had learned to court favors from the Spanish.
Exactly when the Ute and Comanche initiated sustained diplomatic relations is unknown. No records identify when Ute traders came into Comanche camps, traded horses and other goods, and laid the foundation for future relations. Ties between the Ute and the Comanche likely solidified during the Spanish absence in the 1680s as horses, goods, and traders filtered into the north. The Spanish absence, moreover, reshaped Ute diplomacy. For while the Spanish had welcomed Ute traders before 1680, their prolonged absence created new exigencies for Ute leaders. For over twelve years, the Ute wondered when and, more important, whether the Spanish would return, and with each passing year, they increased their raids against Pueblo communities. As de Vargas noted, against "the Tewa, Tano, Taos, Picuris, Jemez, and Keres," the Ute "have continued the war . . . with great vigor." During the Spanish absence, then, northern raiders gained not only greater knowledge of the region but also increased confidence in their capacities to attack the Rio Grande. 43 When the Spanish did return, they noted the increased power of Ute bands throughout the north. They also noted the presence of the Ute's newest ally, the Comanche. In the earliest Spanish references to Comanches, New Mexicans not only refer to Utes but also to the growing violence in the region. First documented in 1706, when military reports identified them on New Mexico's eastern Plains, the Comanche and their Ute allies preoccupied New Mexicans attempting to facilitate the return of Pueblos taking refuge at the Apache town of El Cuartelejo. Sergeant Major Juan de Ulibarri reported that Utes and Comanches were besieging Apachería. En route to the Apache village, Ulibarri learned of an impending Ute and Comanche attack. Along the Arkansas River in Colorado, his party met Apache warriors moving to fight the Ute and Comanche, and on their return to Santa Fe, the Spaniards camped among Jicarilla Apaches who were recovering from recent Ute and Comanche raids. Undocumented before the Pueblo Revolt, the Comanche now fought alongside their Ute allies for control of the north. 44 Bolstered by these early raids, the Ute and Comanche in the first two decades of the 1700s increased their territorial range at the expense of surrounding Indian peoples, particularly the Apache and Navajo. As Ulibarri reported, Apache communities at La Jicarilla, El Cuartelejo, and other sites northeast of Santa Fe faced repeated Ute and Comanche attacks. To the northwest, Navajo raids against New Mexico similarly dropped off as the Ute and Comanche occupied the prime trading and raiding territories on the western banks of the Rio Grande. Coupled with Captain Roque de Madrid's punitive campaigns against the Navajo in 1705 and 1709, the Ute-Comanche presence decisively curbed Navajo movements into the province, leading one Navajo historian to conclude that "an unprecedented period of peace, lasting more than fifty years, followed the campaigns of 1709. During this time, known Spanish documents record not a single Navajo raid upon Spanish settlement. . . . The Navajo clearly and earnestly wished no war with the Spaniards. Indeed, their desire for peace went deeper: they wanted Spanish protection against a deadly alliance."45 The scourge of seventeenth-century New Mexico, the Navajo and Apache no longer dominated New Mexico's northern borderlands and now frequently turned to the Spanish as well as to each other for protection against this new and "deadly alliance."
The Height of the Comanche-Ute Alliance,
1706-1740s
In the 1600s, Apaches, Navajos, Pueblos, and Spaniards had displaced new relations of violence to the north, engulfing Shoshone-speakers in the region's violent political economy. Now, in the first decades of the 1700s, allied Ute and Comanche bands redirected such violence back against New Mexico and its Indian allies. The Ute and Comanche raided not just for resources, however, but also for strategic ends. Raiding New Mexican settlements seasonally, the Ute and Comanche often simultaneously fought to dislodge Apache and Navajo settlements that provided buffers against their raids into the province. Apache communities northeast of Santa Fe consequently grew more reliant on Spanish protection, as wave after wave of alliance attacks crashed against their villages in the early 1700s. New Mexicans also now joined Apache warriors in campaigns against the alliance, solidifying the social and political ties between their village worlds. Many Spanish leaders, particularly Franciscan missionaries, even encouraged colonial officials in Mexico City to incorporate besieged Apaches into the kingdom of Cross and Crown, hopeful that the beleaguered and increasingly faithful Apache would soon become the first Spanish converts on the Plains. Plans for missionization were, however, quickly dashed, as New Mexicans in the 1720s became unwittingly drawn into a devastating encounter with advancing French forces, whose increased presence on the Plains combined with Ute-Comanche attacks to derail Spanish expansion in the region altogether. Ute-Comanche raids, in fact, became so severe that the centuries-old Apache trading centers along the Arkansas and Canadian rivers remained more than simply unincorporated into the Spanish empire. They became completely displaced. Never again would native groups live in horticultural villages along these watersheds, as the descendants of these communities became among the first diasporic peoples in the Southwest. Also displacing multiple New Mexican settlements, alliance control by midcentury appeared unparalleled.
Throughout the first decades of the 1700s, alliance raiders struck the colony and its Apache allies with furious regularity. In 1716, while Governor Félix Martínez was visiting western Pueblos, Ute and Comanche raiders attacked Taos. In 1718 Jicarilla Apaches arrived at Taos pleading for Spanish protection, and a year later Utes raided Taos and Cochiti pueblos, stealing children and horses and prompting Governor Antonio Valverde Cosio to call together the province's leading citizens to decide how best to deal with these northern raiders. "The Ute nation and Comanche nations, who always united, have been committing robberies," Valverde reported. "It appears to all, that since their own lands are more than two hundred leagues away from this kingdom . . . they are coming to attack us on sight." Mounting a massive force in the summer of 1719 of "some six hundred with as many horses," this force of presidio soldiers, settlers, Pueblo auxiliaries, and Apache warriors, failed to engage the alliance. Smoldering fires, recently abandoned possessions, and fresh tracks enticed but ultimately frustrated the phalanx in its month-long campaign. While failing to punish the alliance, Valverde succeeded in cementing relations with northern Apaches, of whom the alliance had "killed many . . . and carried off their women and children." 46 Beleaguered by alliance raids, Apache villages throughout the 1720s eagerly welcomed New Mexicans and even agreed to accept Spanish colonization. They heeded governors' calls for their baptism, erected crosses over their homes, and pledged their loyalty to Cross and Crown. Hearing of their fidelity, Viceroy Marques de Valero ordered Valverde to missionize these Plains people, partly in order to curb alliance attacks while also stemming French advances to the east. News of Ute and Comanche power now combined with larger geopolitical concerns to attract the attention of New Spain's leading imperial officials. Valero, Valverde, and their Apache allies' dreams of becoming an extension of the empire, however, were soon dashed by the defeat of Pedro de Villasur, Valverde's lieutenant general. Ordered in 1720 to travel north to monitor French inroads among northern peoples, Villasur and his Pueblo auxiliaries were routed by a Pawnee-French ambush near the confluence of the Platte and Loup rivers in Nebraska. The loss cost New Mexico over thirty presidio soldiers, a third of the trained Spanish garrison, and halted all efforts to colonize Apachería. 47 News of the Villasur debacle quickly spread throughout New Spain, prompting Valero to order an immediate inquiry into the causes of the defeat. After leaving office, Valverde attempted to exonerate himself by offering pictorial representations of Villasur's defeat, likely drawn by surviving Indian auxiliaries or at least based on their testimony. Known as the Segesser Hide Paintings, these two surviving documents offer incomparable insight into the nature of eighteenth-century Plains Indian warfare and into the violent processes of social change remaking New Mexico's northern borderlands. 48 While Segesser II, the well-known portrait of Villasur's defeat, depicts the campaign's demise, Segesser I details an attack by unspecified Indian raiders on an overmatched Indian ranchería. Unsure of the location, combatants, or the reasons behind the making of Segesser I, borderlands historians have often overlooked or offered conflicting assessments of this critical document, in which the identities of both sides remain unrecoverable. 49 Since the attacking warriors are equipped with Spanish weaponry, mounts, and both equestrian and personal armor, several have suggested that these are genizaro or Pueblo auxiliary forces aligned with Valverde.50 None of the defending combatants is mounted or has armor. All of the attackers employ metal weapons such as swords, axes, and metal-tipped lances, indicated on the original by distinct indigo coloring, while only one of the defenders possesses such weaponry. One defender also has a single metal strip attached to his shield.
While scholars debate the possible identities and artists of Segesser I, more focused attention to its actual coloring is warranted. For, like the thousands of northern Indians who came into New Mexico to trade, the unknown artist(s) of Segesser I instinctively recognized the distinctions between Spanish-introduced weaponry and those previously used by native groups. They purposely differentiated between such metals when composing the parchment and understood that such distinctions were necessary. As everyone in the region understood, possession of horses, metals, and armor decided the outcome of many conflicts, and despite the cherublike portraits of women and children, the defending ranchería stands little chance against the intruders. The underequipped were undoubtedly overrun and their women and children, at best, captured. While the identities of these combatants remain unknown, their clash illustrates central themes in borderlands history: native peoples equipped with superior technologies of violence incorporated distant and underequipped societies into the disruptive folds of empire, capturing or enslaving their women and chil-dren whenever possible. As Comanche and Ute raids from this period suggest, Indian raiders attacked moreover for specific economic, military, and political purposes in response to generations of colonial violence.
Possession of technologies of violence alone did not offer immunity from attack. On the contrary, Indian raiders often targeted those with the most sustained trading relations with New Mexico, and throughout the 1720s the Ute and Comanche made life dire for New Mexico's Apache and Navajo allies, whose communities not only stood in the way of alliance raiders, but had also received years of supplies from the Spanish. In the early 1720s, Apache delegations annually came into Santa Fe and recounted sorrowful tales of alliance attacks. Governors, such as Carlos de Bustamante, also visited Apache villages, witnessed the extent of their suffering, and urged the viceroy to establish the proposed and needed missions. After a visit to La Jicarilla, for example, Bustamante reported, "The nations Ute and Comanche had attacked them a second time and abducted . . . their women and children." As Spanish officials in Mexico painstakingly debated whether to colonize Apachería, the Apache began fleeing their homelands. In May 1724, an Apache delegation reported to Bustamante that "since their persons are not being protected . . . they have decided . . . to go to the province of the Navajos," who shared grievances against the alliance.51 For the next three years, the Apache awaited a final decision, and in 1727 unfortunate news arrived. After the northern inspections of Pedro de Rivera, New Spain's visitador, colonial authorities finally decided against Apache colonization and urged the Apache to relocate to New Mexico: they could either leave their homelands for a mission settlement near Taos or endure continued alliance onslaughts alone. 52 Having served as loyal scouts, regular traders, and repeated hosts, Apache leaders felt betrayed. In the violent world of the northern borderlands, however, sedentary Indian settlements outside the protection of Spanish forces were largely untenable, and these Plains villagers had little hope of remaining in their homelands. The cost of equipping distant missions, combined with the continuing onslaughts from the Ute-Comanche alliance, doomed Apache chances for missionization. In 1733, after years of further attacks, the Jicarillas abandoned their villages and came, according to Alfred Barnaby Thomas, "to live near Pecos . . . where a mission was briefly established among them. . . . Soon after, however, the greater part fled . . . though the remnants joined the Taos against the Comanches." 53 The abandonment of La Jicarilla and shortly thereafter of El Cuartelejo signaled the end of sedentary Apache communities north of New Mexico. While some Apaches resettled among the Navajo and Pueblo, most fled south, where they developed raiding economies that paradoxi-cally came to plague Spanish and later Mexican societies. De Rivera's recommendations against colonizing Apachería eventually came to haunt New Mexican, Tejano, and northern Mexican provinces, as Apache refugees, driven south by the Ute-Comanche alliance, became among the most accomplished raiders in western history. 54 While Ute and Comanche raids in and around New Mexico are partially visible in Spanish sources, the same is not true of Spanish and native reprisals. While some governors, such as Valverde, kept detailed accounts of their expeditions, most did not, or their accounts have not survived. Bustamante, for example, in May 1724 referred only in passing to a campaign he led against the alliance in an effort to liberate Jicarilla captives. Recounting the campaign's success, Bustamante wrote, "I had the fortune to restore sixty-four persons" from their alliance captors.55 Making no mention of Ute or Comanche casualties, Bustamente, like earlier governors, led large campaigns to punish alliance raiders. Only documentary traces, however, remain of such encounters, underscoring the need for partial interpretations of these northern histories.
Occasionally, Spanish authorities did record moments from the indigenous wars swirling throughout the north. Like New Mexicans, besieged Apache communities retaliated against the alliance, pursuing raiders and even launching retaliatory campaigns of their own. In 1726 Apache raiders returned to New Mexico with "prisoners who were Comanches."56 Ute and Comanche captives also begin appearing in marriage and legal records from this time. In 1725 an unidentified Ute was married at El Paso, while in 1733 another Ute captive appeared in a court case along with other genizaros who unsuccessfully petitioned the governor for a land grant at Belén, a settlement south of Albuquerque.57 Genizaros, as Ramón Gutiér-rez and James Brooks detail, were exiled Indians, ransomed captives, prisoners of war, and their children who by the mid-eighteenth century came to constitute a caste of detribalized Indians in colonial society. As the Ute and the Comanche warred with New Mexicans they increasingly became captured, eventually becoming members of these subordinate groups. The offspring of colonialism, such captives underscore the intertwined violent and hybrid effects of colonial encounters in the Spanish borderlands. 58 The Ute and the Comanche also increased their own captive-raiding throughout the first half of the 1700s. Whether to replace lost members, to trade to others, or to ransom them back to New Mexico, Ute and Comanche bands, like all surrounding Indian groups, enslaved women and children. With so few sustained accounts, the Southwestern Indian slave trade has often confounded borderlands historians. Many, for example, recoil at Spanish reports of Indian slavery, choosing either to ignore the causes of such brutality or simply to attribute them to presumed innate native traditions and personalities. A few scholars have recently attempted to move beyond such views and have focused instead on the myriad ways captives both bounded and negotiated different cultural groups. 59 Neither of these approaches fully suffices. The Indian slave trade remained prima facie a product of colonialism, and all Spanish accounts, whether from sympathetic friars or condemning magistrates, came from participants implicated in the process of colonization.60 Spanish accounts of Indian slavery must, accordingly, be viewed through an optic of violence that recognizes both the disruptive effects of Spanish intrusion into native worlds and colonial attempts to justify such intrusion. When documenting incidents of Indian "savagery," Spanish recorders, in a sense, bore witness to the violent effects of their own presence while trying to rationalize them. As "indios bárbaros," Utes and Comanches, by definition, performed irrational acts of violence. They acted violently due to nature, not in response to economic or political forces, and Spanish accounts often follow such prescriptions. In the first ethnographic description of the Comanche, for example, Pedro de Rivera in 1727 recounted:
Each year at a certain time, there comes to this province a nation of Indians very barbarous, and warlike. Their name is Comanche. They never number less than 1,500. Their origin is unknown, because they are always wandering in battle formation, for they make war on all the Nations. They halt at whichever stopping place and set up their campaign tents, which are of buffalo hides. . . . And after they finish the commerce . . . which consists of tanned skins, buffalo hides, and those young Indians they capture (because they kill the older ones), they retire, continuing their wandering until another time.61 "Always wandering in battle formation," the Comanche, like their Ute allies, traveled in militarized bands, constantly prepared for defense as well as to enslave weaker neighbors. For Rivera, their "barbarous and warlike" nature explained their enslavement of captives, not their "certain," annual "commerce" with New Mexico.
By the time of the Comanche's earliest sustained appearance in Spanish sources, then, colonial violence had become woven into the fabric of their society. Rivera's claim that Comanche slavers simply killed older captives rather than risk their enslavement was influenced by his racial and cultural prejudices. Yet chauvinism alone cannot explain the slaves of the Comanche. Did the Comanche and other native groups kill older and male captives? If so, why?
Like their many neighbors, the Ute and the Comanche adapted to colonial violence in kind, redirecting it against New Mexico while also displacing it onto more distant native groups. Also like their neighbors, they were influenced by powerful Spanish enticements to trade; Rivera's descriptions after all recount moments of economic exchange. The "certain commerce" that northern peoples brought to New Mexico consisted of northern resources: furs, hides, eventually horses, and also slaves, who throughout the colonial era provided the colony with a growing pool of laborers. New Mexicans "ransomed" Indian captives from surrounding Indian groups, initially "adopting" captives into New Mexican families while eventually in the mid-1700s granting genizaro requests for land.62 Captives were overwhelmingly young women and children whose sexual and reproductive labor became increasingly essential to the colony. Due to constant Indian raids, New Mexico's borders remained unstable, and colonial officials encouraged settlement to buffer against Indian attacks. As equestrian raids destabilized the colony, however, New Mexican leaders in the 1740s increasingly granted genizaro requests for land at towns like Abiquiu along the Chama and further south at Belén, allowing the children of captives, and even former captives themselves, a modicum of rights in colonial society. New Mexican patriarchs, as Ramón Gutiérrez elaborates, employed Indian slaves not only for needed household and agricultural labor but also for psychological and sexual "comforts," as the presence of genizaros and their "illegitimate" children over time underpinned New Mexican hierarchies of honor, patriarchy, and race.63 New Mexico's Indian trade fairs thus became epicenters of the region's evolving slave networks, and violence became increasingly gendered as raiders competed for captives in an effort, partially, to populate the colony's unstable borders. The relations of violence engendered by Spanish intrusion extended far beyond military affairs and shaped the most intimate forms of everyday life within and outside of colonial society. New Mexican as well as Indian captors generally found adult male captives too difficult to enslave, transport, and adopt into New Mexican society; as Rivera implied, they often killed them in battle. Although some male captives were sent south in the 1600s to the mining centers of northern Mexico, throughout the 1700s settlement, defense, and economic development dominated New Mexico's colonial affairs, and the vast majority of captives thus were women and children.64 Moreover, whereas in the 1600s Spanish slavers, like Governor Rosas, directly procured slaves from surrounding nonequestrian Indians in military campaigns, in the 1700s outlying native groups became the primary slave traffickers. While some scholars suggest that patterns of servitude originated in precontact Native America, the violent transformations engendered by colo-nial technologies, economies, and warfare-combined with New Mexicans' growing proclivity for female and young captives-suggest that the increasingly gendered nature of the Indian slave trade stemmed from colonial disruptions, not from precontact Indian "culture."65 Eighteenthcentury Indian groups, themselves recalibrated by powerful and violent changes, thus adopted and extended the patterns of enslavement flowing from Spanish colonization. Although few sources directly reveal the UteComanche alliance's involvement in the Southwestern Indian slave trade, by midcentury colonial settlements increasingly facilitated the traffic of young women and children into New Mexico from Indian traders. After Abiquiu's founding in 1754 and for over a century along the Chama, for example, more than 150 "Utes" were baptized, the vast majority of them women and children. 66 By 1740, the Ute had incorporated the most powerful of northern peoples into an alliance that dominated the most proximate trading and raiding locations on the colony's perimeter. In the northeast, northern Apachería was no more, and Ute-Comanche raiders continued to drive these former Spanish allies further south. On the western side of the Rio Grande, many attributed the sustained Spanish-Navajo peace directly to Ute-Comanche depredations. In 1745, for example, traders among the Navajo noted that Ute and Comanche attacks had forced Navajo families to "live on the tops of the mesas in little houses of stone. And that the reason for their living in those mountains is because the Yutas and Comanches make war upon them."67 The alliance now seemed at the zenith of its power, with few groups, other than mobilized Spanish military campaigns, capable of pursuing alliance raiders. Often moving with impunity along the colony's periphery, the Ute and the Comanche frequently attacked and fled before retaliatory forces were mobilized.
Ute and Comanche control in the north was not absolute, however. Spanish campaigns that did engage the alliance inflicted heavy tolls. In 1747, for example, Governor Codallos y Rabal ambushed a Ute ranchería, killing 107 while capturing 206 slaves and nearly 1,000 horses.68 As with most Spanish engagements, little is known of the exact location, date, and participants, except that in this case, Antonio Santiestevan, a soldier standing guard over the captives, fell asleep and was subsequently tried in Santa Fe after a captive escaped.69 Only because of a guard's negligence does this massacre and enslavement become visible. The following spring, the Ute responded with attacks that forced the abandonment of numerous Chama Valley settlements, as Juan Beitta noted in his March letter to Governor Codallos y Rabal.
As with their dispersal of the Apache, the Ute's ability to displace colonial settlements underscores their power in northern New Mexico. Alliance raids remapped the colony's boundaries and reconfigured its balance of power. The Ute had, however, sustained serious losses to Codallos y Rabal and continued to endure cycles of intertribal conflicts. They had also recently begun losing influence with their Comanche allies. Consummate diplomats and raiders, the Ute still found themselves in a situation of precarious security, particularly because their homelands north of New Mexico remained relatively isolated from the dynamic Plains. While eastern Ute bands raided seasonally onto the Plains with their Comanche allies, they returned to their mountain valleys, leaving the Arkansas, Canadian, and other watersheds behind until the next season. After the Apache dispersal, however, the Plains northeast of Santa Fe became home to vibrant trade centers that linked Indian, New Mexican, and French traders from the east. During the 1730s and 1740s, the Comanche began dominating these lands, occupying former Apache territories while consolidating their control over the rich grazing grasslands of the Southern Plains. While the Ute to the west migrated from mountain parks to Plains river valleys, by 1730, if not sooner, the Comanche had become, as Rivera noted, entirely a Plains people. The Ute dominated northwestern New Mexico, but Comanche control over the colony's northeastern Plains soon proved far more advantageous. The Comanche no longer needed their Ute allies. Indeed, despite the two peoples' long-standing cultural and diplomatic ties, the Ute threatened Comanche diplomacy and, most important, Comanche trade. 70 The first hint of Ute-Comanche tensions occurred in 1735. For the first time, Spanish authorities described the Ute as "enemies" of the Comanche after Comanches had come that year to trade buffalo hides for Spanish knives and expressed animosity toward unspecified Utes. 71 No other direct accounts of Ute-Comanche hostilities remain until the 1750s, but evidence of Comanche disengagement with the alliance reoccurred throughout the 1740s. In the summer of 1748, for example, just months after Bietta's urgent report from the Chama, six hundred Comanches entered Taos and assured their hosts of their lack of involvement in any of the year's previous raids.72 Comanche sights, as Pekka Hämäläinen argues, now centered on their Plains trading centers and on monopolizing trade between New Mexico and French Louisiana. The Comanche were quickly becoming imperialists of their own, and over the next generation their power grew over a constellation of subject peoples, including New Mexicans.73 The Ute-Comanche alliance had developed, expanded, and was now dissolving in a multipolar world.
For the Ute, the changing imperial economies of the Southern Plains, Comanche fortunes, and a new reformist governor in Santa Fe ushered in dramatic realignments in the northwest, realignments that would eventually link New Mexico and Ute communities for the next half century. After taking office in 1749, Governor Tomás Vélez Cachupin began a series of initiatives to incorporate Indian neighbors into a more stable regional economy. Committing to punish northern raiders as well as Spanish settlers who abandoned their villages, he made force and discipline cornerstones in his policies of détente with northern peoples. Comanche and Ute raids continued during his first years and were often met with brutal counterattacks. Unlike many of his predecessors, however, Vélez Cachupin followed such clashes with overtures of peace and captive exchange. While Comanche fortunes flourished on the Plains, Ute stability remained less secure. Generations of raiding, subjugation to Spanish campaigns, and Indian reprisals had exacted heavy tolls on Ute bands, and in the early 1750s, Ute leaders came to New Mexico to sue for peace, inaugurating a dramatically new era in New Mexican-Ute relations.74 By the end of his short but revolutionary tenure, terms of endearment would flow from the governor's lips about these once "savage" peoples. In his report to his successor, Velez Cachupin implored him to "show [the Ute] the greatest kindness. . . . Protect them in their commerce and do them justice . . . to their captain, named Thomas, show all courteousness, great friendship, and love."75 Flowery terms of affection characterized much of the next generation of Spanish-Ute relations, while in application, the emerging Spanish-Ute détente heralded dramatic changes for the lands and peoples throughout New Mexico's growing hinterlands.
Conclusion: Beyond American Indian "Infanticide"-Rethinking Western Indian Responses to Colonial Expansion
While historians have often failed to recognize the centrality of native peoples, such as the Ute, in the making of settler societies, many have recently examined forms of native adaptation to colonial expansion. Indian historians have increasingly analyzed native peoples' creative responses to colonial rule, highlighting the ability of native groups to carve out shared spaces within colonial regimes. Following Richard White's reinterpretation of French-Indian relations in the Great Lakes, colonial historians have attempted to find "middle grounds" where native groups and Europeans encountered each other and together made colonial history.76 Such increased attention to native-European relations has restored Indian peoples to their rightful place at the center of the colonial experience. Indians not only reacted to colonialism but also acted to reshape and mitigate its most horrific forms. This realignment of early American history has, however, often focused excessively on the ties between Indians and Europeans, celebrating Indian agency within the traumatic colonial world. As the history of northern New Mexico suggests, Indian adaptation and survival carried high and often deadly costs for native peoples removed from colonial societies. The ability of the Ute and the Comanche to endure and even prosper amid the region's cycles of violence included countless moments of suffering, enslavement, and warfare not only against colonial settlements but also against less powerful Indian societies that lacked commensurate technologies of violence. Some, like New Mexico's Jicarilla Apache allies, failed to adopt requisite forms of military equestrianism, while others were driven into less productive lands. As the Ute and New Mexicans built common institutions and forms of alliance in the second half of the 1700s, the forms of violence intrinsic to the region's political economy did not end. They became further displaced onto more distant and, to the Spanish, unknown peoples, groups largely without horses, metal weaponry, and, most important, the means to acquire them. Nonequestrian Great Basin Indians, now known as the Southern Paiutes and Western Shoshones, first became incorporated into the violent world of European colonialism by Ute raiders, many of whom by 1800 lived in migratory slaving societies. 77 The origins of such violence are found in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and in the economies of violence engendered by Spanish intrusion.
By foregrounding shifting patterns and relations of violence, scholars seeking to gauge these colonial histories can further assess indigenous responses to European expansion. Along New Mexico's shifting colonial boundaries, nonequestrian Indians confronted the crisis of European colonization by using the precious few resources acquired through trade, warfare, and plunder to better prepare themselves for their next colonial encounter, be it with imperial or indigenous actors. Some, like unspecified "Ute" and "Comanche" bands, endured the waves of violence that crashed on them before their sustained appearance in colonial archives. Others did not and remain lost to historical inquiry. Locating violence, in time and space, at the center of these worlds necessitates analyses of the forms of warfare, conflict, and resolution initiated by Indian actors in response to colonial expansion. Historicizing these diplomatic, military, and economic relations also brings previously marginalized subjects, like Ute diplomacy, to the centers of historical inquiry, revealing the critical role of native peoples in the making of the early West. Such attention also steps outside of fixed and often problematic assessments of Indian cultural responses to colonial expansion and disputes recent claims about the endurance and import of precontact Indian cultural norms. Assessing how Indians responded to the revolutionary influences of Europeans will always remain central to American history. Our capacity to see into these distant lands, however, remains clouded, as the disruptions that took hold shook many foundations to their core. 
Notes

